Preview: under engineering review. This documentation is a working draft prepared from the security packet and reference architecture. Items marked to confirm are placeholders for REAP engineering to verify before publication. Not indexed by search engines.

Documentation

Credentials and PAM brokering

How REAP obtains device and system credentials, why it holds as few as possible, and how you revoke them.

The credential model

  • Read-only by default. Discovery, telemetry and reasoning use least-privilege, read-only accounts.
  • Brokered, not stored. Where you run CyberArk (opens in a new tab) (HashiCorp Vault (opens in a new tab): planned, not available today), connectors request credentials at time of use; no standing device credentials are held in REAP.
  • Write only for approved runbooks. A separate, scoped account is used for the runbooks you approve; it is subject to approval gates, pre-execution impact analysis, reverse steps where the change is reversible, and audit.
  • Revocable at any time. Disabling the account or the PAM policy stops collection immediately; the console shows the effect.

CyberArk

  1. Create a safe for REAP with the read-only device account(s).
  2. Grant the connector application identity retrieval rights via Central Credential Provider or the Application Access Manager supported interface.
  3. Configure the safe and object names in the connector; test retrieval.
  4. For runbooks: a second safe with the scoped write account; approvals in REAP; session recording remains yours.

HashiCorp Vault (planned)

Status Planned Not available today; the steps below are the design and will be confirmed when the integration is released.
  1. Create a KV or dynamic-secrets path for REAP with the read-only device account.
  2. Issue an AppRole (or the auth method you standardize on) for the connector supported auth methods.
  3. Set TTLs to your policy; connectors renew within lease.
  4. For runbooks: a separate path and policy for the scoped write account.

Without a PAM

  • Credentials are stored encrypted in the connector’s local secret store mechanism and never forwarded to the platform.
  • Rotation: update in the connector; REAP records the rotation event.

Device account privileges

PlatformRead-only accountRunbook account (optional)
Cisco IOS-XE (opens in a new tab)Privilege 15 with TACACS+/RADIUS command authorization limited to show and archive commands, or a custom privilege level with show running-config explicitly enabled (reduced-privilege views omit sections); exact command setScoped to the approved runbook commands via AAA command authorization
Cisco (opens in a new tab) NX-OS (opens in a new tab)network-operator role (read-only)Custom role limited to the approved runbook commands
Arista EOS (opens in a new tab)Read-only roleScoped role
Junos (opens in a new tab)read-only login classCustom class limited to approved statements
HPE Aruba (opens in a new tab)Operator roleScoped role
Palo Alto Networks (opens in a new tab) / Fortinet (opens in a new tab)Read-only admin profile / read-only access profileScoped profile
Engineering to confirm

Last reviewed: October 7, 2026 (draft) · Owner: solutions engineering · Corrections: security@reapnet.ai